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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the internal organization of the ¯rm and the growth process
interact strongly to determine simultaneously the power of incentives within the ¯rm and
the growth rate of the economy. We show how agents within the ¯rm can invest either
by using their own human capital or by relying on some form of reputational capital to
secure implicit relationships within the ¯rm and we discuss how these investments a®ect
the growth rate of the economy.
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1 Introduction
Growth theory recognizes that ¯rms play a key role in the growth process by allocat-
ing resources among sectors of the economy and by inducing innovation. Still ¯rms are
very much considered as a black-box. Indeed, even though they may face various market
constraints, ¯rms are simply modeled as transforming inputs into outputs and internal
constraints are neglected. Implicitly, a major assumption in the literature is that rela-
tionships among the various members of the ¯rm are e±ciently designed to maximize and
redistribute wealth among them. It follows then that the distribution of intra¯rm rents
does not con°ict with pro¯t maximization and, as such, has no impact on the growth
process. Indeed, almost no attention is given to the exact organizational arrangements
that make productive activities feasible and to the incentive contracts which align the
objectives of the ¯rm's members. Following the recent developments of incentive theory,
microeconomists have instead built a whole theory of the ¯rm putting the organization
of the production process and the structure of contractual transactions among its various
partners at the core of the analysis. This \organization" theory discusses how agency
problems a®ect the ¯rm's pro¯t and precisely focuses on the consequences of various
informational problems inside the ¯rm on its overall performances.
A natural research program then is to embedd the insights of agency theory into the
general equilibrium environment of growth theory. To further motivate this research pro-
gram and see that there is more there than just a mere juxtaposition of insights from
both literatures, note with Schumpeter (1942, p. 132) that, due to scale economies in
the production of new economic knowledge, large corporations may have a comparative
advantage in the innovation process. However, this is precisely to reap bene¯ts of those
economies of scale that owners of the ¯rm tend to delegate control of productive assets
to managers and workers and that this delegation creates signi¯cant information prob-
lems. Hence, the very same factors at the source of the growth process, at least from a
Schumpeterian perspective, are also at the source of the agency problems that have so
far been neglected by the theory. How the growth process and these agency problems
interact becomes therefore a crucial aspect to investigate. Expanding on this, one would
like to understand how incentives and organizational forms within the ¯rm respond and
interact with the macroeconomic environment. 1
A close look to the problem at hands shows that the interactions between intra¯rm
incentives and growth may be two-ways. To see that intuitvely, consider an endogenous
growth model with vertical di®erentiation ¶a la Aghion and Howitt (1992). In this kind
of model, ¯rms in the research sectors of the economy are motivated by the perspective
1Besides our own work that we brie°y survey here, a small emerging literature has started to consider
these issues. See Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002), and Fran»cois and Roberts (2002) in this volume.
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of enjoying monopoly pro¯ts when their R&D activity has been successful and allowed
them to replace the incumbent monopolist. Clearly, agency problems in the monopolistic
sectors tend to dampen incentives for innovation since they reduce pro¯ts in these sectors.
This is the ¯rst channel by which growth and contracts interact. Hence quite naturally,
agency problems in intermediate sectors reduce the rate of growth.2
On the other hand, a crucial determinants of agency relationships within any organi-
zation is the fact that they are not short-term but instead made of repeated interactions
involving the same partners over time. The frequency of repetition a®ects then the struc-
ture of agency costs. This frequency however is itself a function of the e®ectiveness of the
process of creative destruction which replaces old social relationships in incumbent mo-
nopolies by fresh ones in newly born ¯rms. This feature provides then the second channel
by which growth and contracts interact. A higher growth rate of the economy reduces
the expected life of monopolies and has a non-trivial impact on its agency costs. This
impact may be negative if agency costs decrease as the ¯rm gets older in expected terms.
This is for instance the case if informational problems becomes less acute over the ¯rm's
life cycle, if incentive compatibility constraints can be smoothed over more periods or if
repeated relationships enlarges the space of incentive feasible transactions3. This impact
may be positive if agency costs increase when relationships are easier to sustain. This
can be the case, in particular, when the ¯rm goes more bureaucratized and routinized as
a response to agency problems.
In Martimort and Verdier (1998, 2000 and 2002), we precisely analyze this two-ways
interaction between the growth process and the internal organization of the ¯rm. We
start from the stylized observation made by sociologists4 that long-lived organizations
are also the most prone to cliques formation. Indeed, the separation between ownership
and control within large scale organizations requires to use various sorts of monitors
and supervisors to ¯ll the informational gap between owners of the ¯rm and privately
informed managers. However, as times passes, supervisors and managers develop norms
of reciprocity with the ultimate goal of implicitly colluding to protect the very information
rents that the owners would like to capture. This collusion is an implicit contract which
can be enforced either by various costly investments in non-directly productive activities
(\in°uence costs") that collusive partners make to secure their transactions or by the
simple repetition of their relationship. In the ¯rst case, the \in°uence costs" divert
resources in the economy away from directly productive activities and the e±ciency of
2Here, we should underscore that this ¯rst e®ect is partial equilibrium in nature. Of course, if one
sector contracts because of agency costs, more resources become available in other sectors and in particular
in the R&D ones. This reallocation e®ect, that may seem at ¯rst glance of a dominated magnitude, goes
in the opposite direction towards fostering growth.
3See Fran»cois and Roberts (2000) for a model illustrating this idea.
4See Crozier (1962) among others.
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the collusion depends on how much resources remain available for the innovation process.
In the second case, colluding agents make a reputational investment in their relationship.
The growth process a®ects the e±ciency of collusion only through its impact on the
colluding agent's expectations over the lifetime of their relationship.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a common framework
to analyze those issues. Section 3 takes stock of the important results it provides.
2 A Simple model of Agency Costs and Schumpeterian
Growth
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 f0;+1g. The economy is populated by a continuous
mass L of individuals with linear intertemporal preferences:
u(y) =
1X
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
(1)
where r is the interest rate and y = fytgt 0¸ is the vector of consumptions. Each of these
individuals is endowed with one unit °ow of labor which receives a wage wt.
There is only one ¯nal consumption good (numeraire) which is produced from a con-
tinuum of intermediate goods by a perfectly competitive sector:
yt =
Z 1
0
yitdi where yit = Aitµitx
®
it (® 2 [0; 1[)(2)
is the °ow of ¯nal good which can be produced using a quantity xit of intermediate
good i at date t. The parameter Ait is the basic productivity of the latest generation of
intermediate good i. The overall productivity is also subject to a random shock µit. Shocks
are i.i.d over time and sectors according to the same common knowledge distribution on
fµ; ¹µg (with ¢µ = ¹µ ¡ µ > 0) with respective probabilities 1¡ º and º.
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistic sector i with a Leontie® tech-
nology: one unit of intermediate good i requires one unit of labor. To depart from any
distortions due to monopoly pricing, we assume that the monopoly can perfectly ¯rst-
price discriminate the ¯rms in the ¯nal sector. A monopolist born at date t in sector i
commits to a production plan fxi(t+¿)(¹µ); xi(t+¿)(µ)g at all future dates t+ ¿ where it may
still be alive. Those outputs correspond respectively to the high and the low productivity
shock that the monopolist may face.5
There are as many research sectors as intermediate goods. R&D ¯rms in each sector
compete to discover the next generation of good i. The arrival of innovations in a given
5It turns out that in equilibrium those outputs grow at a rate (1 + g)
®
®¡1 where g is the growth rate
which is de¯ned below.
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sector follows a Poisson process. An innovation appears with probability ¸Eit 2 [0; 1]
where Eit is the R&D investment of the ¯rm which is measured in productivity-adjusted
units of ¯nal good so that those ¯rms have cost C(Eit) = ¹AtEit:
By innovating in sector i, a R&D ¯rm acquires the leading-edge technology whose
productivity parameter is given by ¹At and becomes a monopolist from that date on. On a
balanced growth path, a fraction ¸E of ¯rms innovate in the research sector at each date
and the leading-edge technology growth rate is g = ¸E(q¡ 1) where q > 1 can be viewed
as a scale of how drastic innovations are. On such a balanced growth path, the wage wt in
the labor market grows also at the same rate. We denote by ! the productivity-adjusted
wage, wt = ! ¹At.
2.1 Agency costs and Growth
Once established, a monopoly becomes a large ¯rm with a separation between ownership
and control creating an adverse selection problem between owners and the informed man-
agement using skilled labor. Let us ¯rst think about the simple case where the ¯rms is
only made of owners and informed management. On top for his reservation level (nor-
malized to 0) informed management must receive an extra information rent to induce
information revelation.6 At any date t+ ¿ , the e±cient management (facing a high shock
¹µ) can lie on the internal productivity of the ¯rm, pretending that the productivity is low
and reducing thereby the returns left to shareholders by an amount
Ut+¿(¹µ) = ¹At¢µx
®
t+¿(µ):
This quantity represents the information rent grasped by the informed management when
a high productivity shock hits, i.e., with probability º. This is an extra cost for sharehold-
ers when they decide how much to produce. Taking this into account, along a balanced
symmetric growth path, the intertemporal pro¯t of a ¯rm in any intermediate sector pro¯t
may be written as:7
Vt =Maxfxt+¿(¢)g
1X
¿=0
Ã
1¡ ¸E
1 + r
!¿
(Eµ[ ¹Atµx
®
(t+¿)(µ) ¡ wt+¿x(t+¿)(µ)]¡ º ¹At¢µx®t+¿(µ))(3)
where E(¢) denotes the expectation operator w.r.t µ. Importantly, everything happens
as if the true productivity bad shock µ was de°ated to take into account the dissipated
information rent and becomes ~µ = µ ¡ º
1¡º¢µ that we assume positive from now on.
Except for this modi¯cation, the optimization problem of the shareholders is the same as
standard complete information problem and the optimal outputs can be easily found as
xt+¿(~µ) = (®~µ=!)
1
1¡® (1 + g)
¿
®¡1 with ~µ = ¹µ; ~µ.
6See La®ont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2).
7In a symmetric equilibrium all sectors grow at the same rate and we can omit from now on indices i.
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In a Schumpeterian growth model, The pro¯t Vt is the engine of innovation. Firms in
the R&D sector satisfy the following arbitrage equation:
¸Vt = ¹At
or to put it di®erently,
¸(1 ¡ ®)® ®1¡® (º¹µ 11¡® + (1 ¡ º)~µ
1
1¡® )
1
1 ¡ ±(E) = !
®
1¡®(4)
where ±(E) = 1¡¸E
1+r
(1 + g)
®
®¡1 < 1 is a strictly decreasing function of E and thus of the
growth rate in the economy. Since periods are small enough to ensure that the interest
rate and the probability of innovation are also small, the following approximation is valid:
1¡±(E) ¼ r+¸E
³
1 + ®
1¡®(q ¡ 1) .´ It is then straightforward to observe that equation (4)
de¯nes a strictly decreasing relationship between E and !. Indeed a higher (anticipated)
rate of creative destruction E reduces the pro¯tability of current innovations. In order
to have the R&D arbitrage condition satis¯ed, the productivity adjusted wage ! has to
decrease to make sure investing in innovations is pro¯table.
The second equation needed to close our macroeconomic model is the equilibrium
condition for the labor market. The L units of skilled labor must be distributed among
intermediate sectors which may be at di®erent ages:
L =
Ã 1X
¿=0
¸E(1¡ ¸E)¿(º¹µ 11¡® + (1 ¡ º)~µ
1
1¡® ) ®
2
1¡® !
1
®¡1 (1 + g)
¿
®¡1
!
(5)
Under mild conditions, it can be shown that there exists a unique macro stationnary
equilibrium pair (!¤; E¤) satisfying (5) and (4). Quite intuitively as the virtual produc-
tivity ~µ is strictly less than true productivity µ, asymmetric information, by reducing the
discounted expected pro¯tabilityof ¯rms, reduces the growth rate and the productivity-
adjusted wage of the economy.
2.2 Collusion, Exogenous Transaction Costs and Growth
At the individual level, ¯rms may want to hire supervisors to ¯ll the informational gap and
increase their pro¯t. Suppose that such a monitor is hired and can report hard evidences
on the productivity shock only when it is bad (µ). The manipulability of information
when it leaves information rent to the manager (¹µ) gives rise to some collusion between
the supervisor and the informed management to protect this rent. Let us also assume
that, because of the lack of enforceability of the implicit collusive agreement between the
supervisor and the informed management, there exists a dead-weight loss of transferring
bribes so that, if the manager gives a bribes b, the supervisor gets only a fraction k of it.
To prevent collusion, the shareholders must now leave a wage st+¿(¹µ) such that:
st+¿(¹µ) = kU(¹µ):
6
A ¯rst obvious remark is that, supervision, even if it is corrupted, reduces the burden
of agency cost for shareholders. Everything happens now as if the virtual productivity
shock in the worst state becomes ~µ(k) = µ¡ k º1¡º¢µ. Modulo this slight modi¯cation,
nothing changes in the above analysis. The equilibrium growth rate E(k) decreases with
larger values of k. Indeed, larger values of k are associated to easier collusion between the
management and supervision functions. This, in turn makes incentive and informational
problems more severe and reduce thereby the ¯rm's pro¯tability. In the limit of a perfect
collusion without transaction cost (ie. k = 1), the growth rate is E¤: It corresponds to
the case where supervision is totally useless to the ¯rm. More generally, more collusion
inside the ¯rm dampens the growth rate of the economy.
3 Endogenous Transaction Costs
The parameter k above, when conveniently endogenized, provides the reverse link between
the macroeconomy and the internal organization of the ¯rm.
Suppose ¯rst that colluding agents may divert resources away from productive ac-
tivities to improve side-contracting. This is the basic theme that is developed in Mar-
timort and Verdier (2000). To see the consequence of these unproductive upfront in-
vestments, suppose that k is an increasing and concave function of l8 the amount of
labor diverted in those activities. The expected discounted bene¯t of colluding, namely
ºk(lt) ¹At¢µ
³P1
¿=0
³
1¡¸E
1+r
´¿
x®t+¿(µ)
´
¡ wtlt should be maximized to ¯nd the demand for
unproductive labor. This yields the f.o.c:9
!
1
®¡1 = k0(l)(®~µ(k))
1
1¡®¢µ
0
@ 1
1 ¡ ±(1+r)1+g
1
A :(6)
and implicitly a function l = l¤(E;!): The equilibrium levels (l0; E0; !0) are thus obtained
jointly by looking at (4), (6) and (5) where in the latter equation L is now replaced by
the the amount of productive labor L¡ l.
We have seen above that, for a given quality of side-contracting, the equilibrium
innovation e®ort E¤ and the productivity adjusted wage !¤ are decreasing functions of k.
At the same time, according to (6), the incentives to improve side-contracting l = l¤(E;!)
decrease also with the level of R&D e®ort E and the wage rate !. These monotonicities
8Satisfying the Inada conditions k 0(0) = +1 and k0(+1) = 0 to insure interior solutions.
9We assume that the investment in unproductive activities is simultaneous with the o®er of contract
made by the shareholders. This assumption avoids that the colluding agents choose l anticipating the
impact that it has on the equilibrium outputs and rents. The goal of the investment is only to improve the
technology of side-contracting. This assumption can be justi¯ ed when those investments are not directly
observable by the owners of the ¯rm. In Martimort and Verdier (2000), we look at the case where l is
chosen before the contract.
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generate a strategic complementarity between the macro and the micro environments.
Indeed, less innovation makes monopolies in the intermediate sectors enjoy a relatively
quiet life. As their expected life time increases, investment into unproductive activities
becomes more valuable. This, in turn, decreases the pro¯tability of the intermediate
sectors and the incentives to innovate in R&D sectors. Depressed incentives in the R&D
sectors reduce further the rate of creative destruction in the economy, ensuring an even
more quiet life to monopolies. Thanks to this strategic complementarity between the
micro and the macro sides of the model, multiple stationary equilibria may therefore arise.
Economies sharing the same fundamental characteristics may end up in very di®erent
long-run situations in terms of their internal organization and aggregate macroeconomic
performances.
Instead of being true physical resources, the investments made to improve side-contracting
between supervisors and agents may be untangible in the case of self-enforcing collusive
behavior. Suppose that collusion within the ¯rm born at date t is enforced with the
following trigger strategies. As long as the supervisor reports ¹µ when µ has realized, the
agent gives a bribes bt+¿ and gives zero otherwise and, as long as the agent has given
a positive bribe in the past, the supervisor reports ¹µ when µ has realized and reports
truthfully otherwise. It can then be shown (see Martimort and Verdier 2002) that there
is no scope for such self-enforceable collusion when
1X
¿=0
Ã
1¡ ¸E
1 + r
!¿
st+¿(¹µ) ¸
1X
¿=1
Ã
1¡ ¸E
1 + r
!¿
Ut+¿(¹µ):(7)
That is when the expected discounted sum of wages paid to the supervisor in the good
state ¹µ is larger than the lagged expected discounted sum of informational rents that have
to be left to management. On a stationary growth path, this collusion proof constraint
can be reduced to10
st(¹µ) ¸ ±(E)Ut(¹µ):
The self-enforceability of collusion entails a dead-weight loss of side-contracting. More
speci¯cally, we have now k = ±(E) < 1. As the future of the relationship within the ¯rm
has higher prospects, it becomes easier to transfer bribes and collusion is more e±cient.
Since ±(E) decreases with the rate of creative destruction E , growth plays a signi¯cant
role in determining the kind of incentives schemes that prevail. The creative destruction
phenomenon may act like a threat of termination for implicit relationships within the ¯rm.
As such, it helps owners to improve the period-per-period pro¯t of the ¯rm even though
it obviously reduces the discounted sum of stream pro¯ts. A corollary of our analysis is
that ¯rms are more bureaucratic (with lower wages for supervisors and greater output
distortions) when the growth rate of the economy is lower. The model predicts a negative
correlation between ine±ciency within ¯rms and the growth rate of the economy.
10See Martimort and Verdier (2002) for more details.
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Our model generates also a multiplier e®ect. Exogenous upward shifts in parameters
such as ¸ and q exacerbates the growth rate in the economy as in stantard endogenous
growth model. However, they also reduce the e±ciency of side-contracting which in
turns improves pro¯ts in intermediate sectors and triggers even more growth. As an
example, the arrival of a new general purpose technology which improves productivity in
all sectors of the economy leads to a signi¯cant increases in the growth rate and changes
organizational structures, bringing them towards less bureaucratic structures.
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